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I. Introduction 
This paper shows how concerns for fairness affect the optimal provision of incentives. Traditional 
contract theory is based on the assumption that principals and agents are solely interested in their 
own material payoffs. While this assumption may be an accurate description of the behavior of many 
people, it is clearly contradicted if applied to all people. In fact, there is by now considerable 
evidence indicating that a substantial fraction of the people also cares about reciprocal fairness (see 
e.g. the surveys of Camerer 2000, and Fehr and Schmidt 2000).1 In this paper we show theoretically 
and by a series of experiments that the existence of a fraction of fair-minded people has dramatic 
consequences for the optimality of different types of contracts. Based on the recently developed 
theory of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) we show theoretically that contracts that are 
optimal when all actors are selfish may be much less efficient when there is a minority of people who 
care about fairness. Furthermore, contracts that would be very inefficient if all actors were selfish, 
may achieve astonishingly high levels of efficiency when there are some fair-minded people. Thus, 
our theoretical results strongly suggest that concerns for fairness should be taken into account in the 
design of optimal incentive schemes.  
Our experiments provide substantial support for these theoretical predictions. The type of 
contract that is optimal according to standard contract theory turns out to be far less efficient than 
predicted by this theory, while contracts that are predicted to be very inefficient if all agents are 
purely self-interested turn out to be superior. The experimental results clearly suggest that this 
reversal in contract efficiency is due to the existence of fair subjects. The principals in our 
experiments seem to understand this quite well. A large majority of them chooses the contract that is 
predicted to be optimal in the presence of a minority of fair agents. Those who choose the contract 
predicted by the standard theory do very poorly.  
To better understand the nature of our results consider one of our experiments in more detail. 
Suppose that the principal wants to induce the agent to spend effort which is personally costly to the 
agent. Effort is observable by both parties. However, it can be verified to the courts only if the 
principal invests in a verification technology. If she makes this investment, she can offer an 
“incentive contract” to the agent, which fines the agent for unsatisfactory performance. The problem 
                                                 
1 Reciprocally fair people respond to friendly actions in a friendly manner, but they retaliate in response to hostile 
actions. These friendly and hostile responses also prevail in one-shot situations and when they are costly for the 
responder (see Rabin 1993 for this definition of reciprocal fairness). 
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with the incentive contract is that the verification technology is imperfect and that the fine that can 
be imposed on the agent is bounded, so the highest implementable effort level is positive but falls 
short of the efficient effort level. Alternatively, the principal can offer a “bonus contract” which does 
not rely on effort verification and enforcement by third parties. Instead, the principal announces to 
make a voluntary bonus payment if the agent’s effort is to her satisfaction. The problem with the 
bonus contract is that the principal cannot be forced to pay the bonus.  Note that the bonus contract is 
highly incomplete because it does neither constrain the principal’s bonus payment nor the agent’s 
effort level. The incentive contract, in contrast, is less incomplete because it makes pay explicitly 
contingent on effort.  
Given that each principal interacts with each agent only once in the experiment, a selfish 
principal would never pay the bonus. If it were common knowledge that all principals are selfish, 
rational agents would choose minimal effort levels. Thus, according to standard contract theory, the 
bonus contract is doomed to fail, while the incentive contract is predicted to do much better. The 
incentive contract does not achieve first best efficiency, but at least it induces the agents to choose a 
medium level of effort. Yet, we show theoretically that if there is a minority of reciprocally fair 
subjects then the incentive contract performs worse than predicted by standard contract theory, while 
powerful incentives can be given by the incomplete bonus contract. In fact, in our experiments the 
bonus contract turned out to be much more efficient and much more profitable than the incentive 
contract.  
The experiment can also be used to illustrate some of the intricate and often surprising effects 
that arise when some (but not all) people are fair-minded. A fair principal will pay the bonus if the 
agent worked sufficiently hard. Thus, if the fraction of fair principals is not too small, it is profitable 
for a purely self-interested agent to choose a high effort level. This makes it profitable for a selfish 
principal to mimic the contract offered by the fair principals in order to benefit from the high effort 
levels of the selfish agents under a bonus contract without paying, in fact, the bonus. Yet, fair-
minded agents strongly dislike being the sucker, i.e., they experience additional disutility if they 
work hard but do not receive the bonus. If the principal cannot credibly signal that she is going to 
pay the bonus, fair agents are not willing to work under a bonus contract. Hence, it may happen that 
the existence of fair principals induces the selfish agents to perform well while the existence of 
selfish principals induces the fair agents to provide little effort under a bonus contract. Thus, 
surprisingly, too many fair agents can be detrimental to the efficiency of a bonus contract.  
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Our paper can also been seen as a contribution to the literature on incomplete contracts. The 
simplicity and incompleteness of many contracts is a puzzle for traditional contract theory which 
predicts that contracts should depend on all verifiable information that contains statistical 
information about the agent’s action or type (see, e.g., Holmström, 1982, Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
However, actual contracts frequently specify important obligations of the contracting parties in fairly 
vague terms, and they do not tie the parties’ monetary payoffs to measures of performance that 
would be available at a relatively small cost.2 Thus, it seems that many contracts are left deliberately 
incomplete.  
There have been many attempts to explain contractual incompleteness. Some papers, e.g. 
Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1994), Nöldeke and Schmidt (1995), or Edlin and Reichelstein 
(1996) argue that in some situations a properly designed incomplete contract that is completed by 
renegotiation implements the first best already, so there is no need to write a more complete contract. 
Other papers (e.g. Che and Hausch, 1998, Segal, 1999, and Hart and Moore, 1999) show that, 
although the best incomplete contract does not implement the first best, a more complete contract 
cannot improve the situation and is of no value to the contracting parties. Spier (1992) and Allen and 
Gale (1992) argue that a principal may offer an incomplete contract, because a more complete 
contract would be interpreted as an unfavorable signal by the other party.  
Our paper differs from this literature by pointing out that an incomplete contract may rely on 
fairness and reciprocity as an enforcement device. Moreover, the experimental results show that this 
enforcement mechanism can be very effective, and that the large majority of principals used it quite 
successfully. The incomplete bonus contract is more efficient than our less incomplete incentive 
contract because it is less complete and thus gives more freedom to the parties to reciprocate.  
This last insight is closely related to the literature on implicit incentives in repeated 
relationships. MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) consider a principal agent game similar to the one 
considered in this paper where the agent is free which effort to spend while the principal is free what 
bonus to pay. If this game is infinitely repeated, then there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in 
which the agent works efficiently and the principal pays a generous bonus in every period. The 
equilibrium is sustained by the threat that, if any party deviates, the inefficient equilibrium where the 
agent does not work and the principal does not pay a bonus will be played in all subsequent periods. 
                                                 
2 For example, a typical contract for a university professor does not make the salary directly contingent on easily 
measurable and verifiable measures of performance such as citations, teaching ratings or the placement of Ph.D. students.  
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Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994), Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995) and Bernheim and Whinston 
(1998) extend this analysis and show in different setups that it may be beneficial not to contract on 
some variables that are easily verifiable and contractible in order to give more discretion to the 
parties to retaliate to a deviation from the implicit contract. However, all of these models are based 
on repeated game effects. In contrast, our paper shows that implicit contracts can be sustained even 
in a one-shot principal-agent game if some players are concerned about fairness and reciprocity.  
Finally, our theoretical and experimental results provide strong support for Holmström and 
Milgrom’s (1991) hypothesis, that it may be optimal to give no explicit incentives at all if the agent 
has to engage in multiple tasks and if some of these tasks cannot be contracted upon. Giving 
incentives for the contractible tasks can induce the agent not to engage at all in the non-contractible 
tasks which may be very inefficient. However, in order to show that an incomplete contract that 
gives no explicit incentives at all is more efficient, Holmström and Milgrom (1991) assume that the 
agent is intrinsically motivated and will choose sufficiently high effort levels even in the absence of 
any explicit incentives. In contrast, we show that, due to the existence of fair principals, it is not 
necessary to rely on intrinsic motivation because incomplete bonus contracts turn out to be a very 
effective method of efficient effort elicitation in all tasks. We report on an experiment that captures 
Holmström and Milgrom’s multi-task principal agent problem. In the experiment it turned out that 
the incomplete bonus contract is more efficient and more profitable than a more complete piece rate 
contract that makes pay contingent on the effort in the contractible task.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section IIA sets up a simple principal agent 
framework that is the baseline for the first series of experiments. In this setting there is only a single 
task to be performed by the agent. In Section IIB we derive alternative hypotheses that are based on 
the assumption that a non-negligible minority of the subjects is also motivated by fairness concerns. 
Section IIC describes the experimental procedures and Section IID presents the experimental results. 
In Part III we look at a multi-task principal agent problem in the spirit of Holmström and Milgrom 
(1991). Section IIIA describes the experimental design, Section IIIB derives the alternative 
hypotheses based on the existence of fair subjects, and Section IIIC presents the results of these 
experiments. Part IV summarizes our main results and concludes the paper.  
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II. Contract Choice in the Presence of a Single Task 
 
A. The Principal-Agent Problem 
This section presents a simple principal-agent problem and our first experimental design. Consider a 
principal who hires an agent to carry out production. Suppose that both parties are risk-neutral.3 If 
the agent exerts effort e ≥ e, he incurs a private cost c(e) (measured in monetary terms with c(e)=0, 
c'(e) > 0, and c''(e) > 0), and he generates a gross profit v(e) that is strictly increasing and concave in 
e. Let eFB > e denote the unique first best efficient effort level that maximizes v(e)-c(e).  
We assume that gross profits and effort costs cannot be contracted upon. Furthermore, though 
both parties observe the agent's effort level, effort is only partially verifiable to the courts. For 
concreteness, we assume that the principal can invest in a verification technology at a fixed cost k 
that renders effort verifiable to the courts with probability p (0 < p < 1). If the principal does not 
invest into verification, effort is not verifiable. The principal also has the option to impose a fine f on 
the agent. The fine has to be paid to the principal only in case of verified shirking because the courts 
enforce only those contractually specified payments that are contingent on verifiable events. f  has to 
obey 0 < f < f’ where f’ is the maximal feasible fine and pf’ < c(eFB).  
The timing of events is as follows. At date 0 the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract 
offer to the agent and decides whether to incur the verification cost. The contract specifies a payment 
scheme for the agent. If the agent rejects the offer, both parties get their reservation utilities that we 
normalize to 0. If the agent accepts, he has to choose his effort level e at date 1. At date 2, a random 
draw determines whether the agent’s effort is verifiable (in case k has been invested). Then payoffs 
are realized and payments are made.  
In the experimental design we chose the following parameters for this simple principal agent 
problem. The agents could choose effort e ∈ {1, ... ,10} with effort costs given by Table 1.  
 
                                                 
3 The assumption of risk neutrality is justified in view of the calibration results in Rabin (2000). Rabin has shown that 
risk aversion is highly implausible for the typical stake level prevailing in laboratory experiments. Even small degrees of 
risk aversion over the typical experimental stakes imply an absurd degree of risk aversion over larger stakes. Thus, if one 
assumes the validity of expected utility theory, one is essentially forced to assume risk neutrality over the typical 
experimental stake levels. 
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 Table 1: Effort cost function 
e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 20 
 
An effort of e yields a gross profit v(e)=10⋅e to the principal. If the principal invests in the 
verification technology she  can verify the agent’s effort with probability p=1/3 and has to incur the 
fixed cost k=10. The fine that can be imposed on the agent is bounded above by f’=13. Note that in a 
first best world the total surplus would be maximized if the principal did not invest in verification 
and the agent chose e=10 which would yield v(e)-c(e) = 80.4 
A contract which relies on effort verification and explicit, enforceable incentives, will be 
called incentive contract (IC). An IC (w,e*,f) stipulates a wage w, a demanded effort level e*, and a 
fine f, to be paid in case of verifiable shirking. An IC implies the following (expected) monetary 
payoffs:  
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From the point of view of traditional contract theory, the analysis of the (second best) optimal 
contract is straightforward if we make the standard assumption that the principal and the agent both 
want to maximize their material payoffs. The agent has no incentive to provide effort above e=1 
except when the principal stipulates a fine and the resulting expected fine pf exceeds the agent’s 
effort cost c(e). For k=10, the principal will incur the verification cost and impose the maximal 
feasible fine f’=13. The (second best) optimal contract demands an effort level e* from the agent 
such that the non-shirking condition pf’ ≥ c(e*) just holds and the agent has to pay f’ whenever e < e* 
is verified. Given the parameters of the experiment, the optimal demanded effort level is e* = 4. The 
optimal wage offer to the agent is the minimum payment ensuring that a non-shirking agent is just 
willing to accept the contract, i.e., w = c(e*) = 4. The principal’s material payoff from this contract is 
MP = ve* - w – k = 40 – 4 - 10 = 26 while the agent’s material payoff is MA = w - c(e*) = 4 – 4 = 0.5 
                                                 
4 All payoffs are in "tokens". For the conversion rate into DM see Section II.C below. 
5 Note that the agent is indifferent whether to accept or to reject the contract. However, in equilibrium he must accept 
with probability one, otherwise the principal would have been better off by offering a slightly higher wage,  w'+ε, that 
the agent would accept for sure. However, w' + ε cannot be an equilibrium because w' + ε/2 would also be accepted for 
sure by the agent and yields a strictly higher payoff to the principal. Thus, the only equilibrium is the one described 
above. 
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However, the above analysis rests on the important assumption that both players are 
interested only in their own material payoffs. To see the implications of this assumption note that 
effort is observable by both parties. Thus, as an alternative to the above incentive contract, the 
principal could simply "ask'' the agent to put in e* > e and "promise'' him a reward in return. This 
could be done with two different types of contracts:  
(i) Trust Contract (TC): The principal offers the agent an unconditional payment w > c(e) 
which is enforced by the courts. In return, she asks the agent to put in effort e*>e, which 
cannot be enforced by the courts. If the agent accepts a trust contract, he is not obliged to 
choose e = e*; he can choose any feasible effort level, e ∈ {1, ... ,10} at date 1. The 
monetary payoff from a trust contract (w,e*) is given by MA = w – c(e), for the agent, and MP 
= 10e – w, for the principal, where e is the agent’s actual effort level. 
(ii) Bonus contract (BC): In a BC (w,e*,b*) the principal offers a low, enforceable base wage w 
≥ c(e) and asks the agent to spend effort e*>e. Furthermore, the principal announces to pay a 
bonus b* ≥  c(e*) if the agent chooses e ≥ e*. However, neither the agent’s effort nor the 
principal’s bonus payment are enforceable. If the agent accepts a bonus contract, he chooses 
any effort e ∈ {1, ... ,10} at date 1. Then, at date 2, the principal is informed about e and 
chooses the actual bonus b. The principal is not obliged to pay b = b*; she can choose any b 
≥ 0. A bonus contract implies monetary payoffs MA = w – c(e) + b, for the agent, and MP = 
10e – w – b, for the principal. 6 
Both types of contract are less complete than the incentive contract because in the incentive 
contract the principal credibly ties compensation to the agent’s performance. Moreover, in a sense 
the bonus contract is more incomplete than the trust contract. The trust contract is not conditional  on 
the agent’s effort, but it does bind the behavior of the principal. In a trust contract the total 
compensation of the agent is fixed ex-ante in a binding manner. In contrast, the bonus contract gives 
discretion to both parties. The agent is free how much effort to choose and the principal is free what 
bonus to pay.  
To examine the principals’ preferences for the different contracts we implemented two 
treatment conditions in the experiments. In the first treatment, the TI-treatment, the principals could 
choose between the trust and the incentive contract. In the second treatment, the BI-treatment, they 
                                                 
6 In all three types of contracts the principal was constrained to choose w ≥ c(e*). We imposed this constraint in order to 
make sure that loss aversion does not affect the behavior of the agents. 
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had a choice between a bonus and an incentive contract. Note, however, that in the BI-treatment 
principals could, in fact, also propose a trust contract because the trust contract is a special case of a 
bonus contract. When the bonus contract is available principals are free to not promise a bonus, i.e., 
instead of paying a “low” base wage, w say, and promising a bonus, b* say, they can always offer a 
binding, unconditional, wage w = w + b*, which is tantamount to a trust contract. Therefore, the 
principals’ behavior in the BI-treatment reveals their preferences with regard to all three available 
contract types.  
Obviously, according to the self-interest model the trust contract and the bonus contract are 
doomed to fail. With a trust contract the agent knows that his wage is fixed and independent of his 
effort level. Therefore, he chooses e = e. In a bonus contract the principal never pays the promised 
bonus at date 2. Anticipating this, the agent again chooses e = e at date 1. Thus, the equilibrium 
wage offer in a trust or a bonus contract is given by w = c(1) = 0. This offer is accepted by the agent 
and payoffs are given by MP = 10 – 0 = 10  and MA = 0 – 0 = 0. Remember that if the principal 
offers the incentive contract (w=4,e’=4,f=13), her equilibrium payoff is given by MP = 4⋅10 – 4 – 10 
= 26 while the agent gets MA = 4 – 4 = 0. Thus, the clear prediction of the self-interest model is that 
in both treatments the principal will opt for the incentive contract. 
If, however, principals and agents are not only self-interested but are also motivated by 
reciprocity and concerns for fairness, the outcome is less clear. In the next section we will discuss the 
implications of fairness concerns on optimal contractual design and derive some testable predictions 
for our principal agent problem.  
 
B. Implications of Reciprocal Fairness  
It is well known from day to day experience and from many controlled experiments that a non-
negligible fraction of the people do behave in a reciprocally fair manner (see, e.g., Camerer 2000, 
Fehr and Schmidt 2000). In Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) it has also been shown that 
fairness concerns are important for contract enforcement.7 People who are motivated by reciprocal 
fairness are willing to sacrifice resources to be kind to those who are perceived to be kind (positive 
                                                 
7 There are, however, crucial differences between our paper and Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (FGK, 1997). In FGK 
only one type of contract was feasible. FGK could thus not examine the principals‘ contract preferences nor could they 
say anything about the efficiency of different types of contracts. Moreover, in contrast to FGK, our paper is based on a 
precise model of fairness. Therefore, in addition to the experimental results, we also provide precise theoretical insights 
into the role of fairness in incentive provision.  
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reciprocity) and to punish those who are perceived to be unkind (negative reciprocity). Whether an 
action is perceived to be kind or unkind depends – among other things - on the distributional 
consequences of the action.  
What are the implications of the above qualitative definition of reciprocal fairness for our 
experiment? By offering a generous trust contract the principal can appeal to the reciprocity of the 
agent, and the agent may indeed reciprocate by providing e>e. If the agent is offered a bonus 
contract he may choose a high effort level in order to appeal to the reciprocity of the principal, and 
the principal may indeed reciprocate by paying a bonus voluntarily. Thus, both the TC and the BC 
may well be more efficient than predicted by the self-interest model. Whether they will be more 
efficient than the IC is, however, an open question that cannot be answered on the basis of general, 
qualitative, notions of reciprocity. The principal may, e.g., also appeal to the agents’ reciprocity in 
the IC which may render the IC also more efficient than predicted by the self-interest model. 
Therefore, it is well possible that the IC still is the superior contract in the presence of reciprocally 
fair people because it allows to combine explicit material incentives with an appeal to the agents’ 
reciprocity.  
However, in the absence of a precise and tractable model of reciprocal fairness nothing 
specific can be said. It may be that the TC and the BC are more or less efficient than the IC. 
Therefore, we rely in the following on a simplified version of the theory of inequity aversion 
developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). This model captures some aspects of reciprocal fairness in a 
tractable way and is consistent with the outcome of many different experimental games.8 However, 
although we use the Fehr-Schmidt model as a tool to derive quantitative predictions, we would like 
to stress that we do not regard our experiments as a test of this theory against other theories of 
fairness.9 
The theory of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) has two main ingredients: First, the theory assumes 
that some people are not only concerned about their own material payoff but also care about inequity 
                                                 
8 Fehr and Schmidt apply the theory e.g. to ultimatum, market, public good, and gift exchange games, and show that the 
interaction of the distribution of types and the strategic environment can explain the major facts in these games. 
9 In fact, it is well possible that other theories of equity (e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or of intention-based 
reciprocity (e.g., Rabin 1993, Falk and Fischbacher, 1999, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1999, or Charness and Rabin, 
2000) yield similar predictions. Our experiments have not been designed to discriminate between these models. The main 
reason for our application of the theory of inequity aversion is that this theory is relatively simple compared to most other 
fairness theories and provides nevertheless precise and interesting insights into the impact of fairness considerations on 
contractual choices. 
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or, in our context, inequality.10 Second, the theory acknowledges that people differ. Some people are 
very much concerned about inequality and have a high willingness to pay in order to reduce it, while 
others only care about their own material payoff. In the two-player case the utility function of 
inequity averse (fair) players is given by 
Ui(x) = xi - αi max{xj - xi,0} - βi max{xi - xj,0}, 
 i ∈ {1,2}, i ≠ j, where x=(x1,x2) denotes the vector of monetary payoffs and βi ≤ αi, 0 ≤ βi < 1. In 
this utility function, the term weighted with αi measures the utility loss that stems from inequality to 
i’s disadvantage, while the term weighted with βi measures the loss from advantageous inequality. 
We use a grossly simplified version of this theory. We assume that there are 60 percent self-
interested types (αi = βi = 0) and 40 percent “fair” types. Fair subjects exhibit αi ≥  βi > 0.5, i.e., they 
have a willingness to pay in order achieve equality.11 If the inequality is to their disadvantage, they 
are prepared to engage in costly "punishment" in order to reduce the payoff of their opponent. If the 
inequality is to their advantage, they are willing to spend resources in order to benefit the other 
player. Subjects with αi ≥  βi > 0.5 are willing to share the surplus of a contract equally and reject 
offers that give them less than 25 percent of the surplus. The evidence from many experiments seems 
roughly compatible with the assumption that 40 percent of all subjects fall in this category.  
On the basis of these assumptions, our principal agent problem can be analyzed using 
standard game theoretic tools. The full analysis is not difficult but somewhat lengthy and is therefore 
relegated to an appendix that can be found on our webpage.12 Here, we want to report the main 
predictions that follow from this analysis and give the intuition for them: 
Hypothesis 1 [Trust contracts]: Increasing the wage in a trust contract increases the effort of the 
fair agents, but, on average, the effort increase is too small to make a wage increase profitable for 
the principal.  
                                                 
10 There is no generally accepted notion of fairness, but probably all fairness definitions imply that equals should be 
treated equally. In our experiments, the subjects enter the laboratory as equals. They have no information about their 
opponents and do not know with whom they trade. Thus, in these very simple environments, it seems natural to define 
equality as the reference point for a fair payoff distribution. 
11 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for a more extensive discussion of the experimental evidence on the distribution of 
inequity averse types. When Fehr and Schmidt calibrate their model to explain the quantitative evidence in the different 
games they use four different types, but aggregated they also have that 40 percent of subjects exhibit αi≥ βi>0.5 and that 
60 percent exhibit 0.5>αi≥ βi. 
12 Please visit: http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls_schmidt/experiments/incomplete_contracts/index.html . 
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To see the intuition for H1 consider a fair agent who accepted a generous trust contract. He 
will choose an effort level that equalizes the monetary payoff of the principal with his own monetary 
payoff: 
MP = 10⋅e - w = w - c(e) = MA 
Using the implicit function theorem, we get 
)('10
2
ecdw
de
+
=   
Thus, for a fair agent e increases with w, but, if the fraction of fair agents in the population is q = 0.4, 
then an increase of w by 1 token increases average effort by at most ∆e = 0.4⋅2/11 = 0.07 which 
increases the principals gross profit by at most 10⋅0.07 = 0.7 tokens. Hence, a wage increase does not 
pay off for a selfish principal.13 What about an inequity averse principal? A generous wage will not 
pay off in monetary terms, and it will generate inequality to the principal’s disadvantage whenever a 
selfish agent chooses e=1. Hence, an inequity averse principal will not pay a higher wage either. The 
reason why the trust contract does not work is that the fraction of fair agents is just too small. It 
would have to be at least 2/3 in order to make it profitable for the selfish principals to offer generous 
wages that induce the fair agents to choose e > 4.14 
Hypothesis 2 [Incentive Contracts]: The optimal incentive contract stipulates the maximal fine, 
f’=13, and demands the maximal incentive compatible effort level, e*=4. Selfish principals offer 
w=4, while fair principals offer w=17, so the average wage offer is w=9.2. Selfish agents accept the 
contract and choose e=e* if and only if the contract is incentive compatible. Otherwise they shirk. If 
the wage offer is generous (w ≥ 17), fair agents will accept and choose e ≥ 4, where e is increasing 
with w. However, if the wage offer is greedy (w < 17), fair agents will either reject or shirk, even if 
the contract is incentive compatible. 
We know already that a selfish principal would offer (w=4, e*=4, f’=13) if all agents were 
selfish. With some fair agents, the selfish principal runs the risk that the fair agents may reject her 
                                                 
13 In other environments the payment of generous wages may be profitable in a trust contract. For example, it has been 
shown experimentally (e.g., Fehr and Falk 1999) that if the principal’s payoff function is MP = (v-w)e with v = 120 and e 
∈ {0.1,0.2, ... ,1}, the payment of generous wages increases profits. The reason is that with this payoff function the 
principal’s effective wage cost is we < w for all e < 1. Thus, paying generous wages is less costly compared to our 
experiments. The above payoff function is, however, not a natural specification for our principal agent problem.  
14 Note that for e > 4, c’(e) ≥ 2. An effort level e ≤ 4 can be implemented with an incentive contract at a lower risk of 
suffering from inequality to the principal. Note also, that even if q > 2/3, the inequity averse principals need not offer 
generous wages because they may still be afraid to suffer from the inequality caused by the selfish agents.  
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offer. Thus, she may want to increase w in order to increase the probability that her offer will be 
accepted. However, it turns out that with q=0.4 increasing the wage does not pay off. Furthermore, 
increasing w somewhat, but not up to the level that aims at equality, is dangerous, because the agent 
may accept the contract but consider it as unfair and shirk. Therefore, (w=4, e*=4, f’=13) is optimal 
for a selfish principal. Note that with probability 0.4 the contracts of the selfish principals will be 
rejected. This neatly illustrates that optimal incentive contracts may become less efficient because of 
the existence of fair subjects. A fair principal will offer (w=17, e*=4, f’=13) which shares the 
surplus equally, if the agent chooses e=4. The maximum fine is necessary to induce the selfish 
agents to choose e=4. A fair principal could pay a higher wage in order to induce the fair agents to 
choose e > 4 (which is no longer incentive compatible), but, for the same reasons as in the trust 
contract, this strategy will lose money on average. 
Given H1 and H2 it is clear that trust contracts do not work while incentive contracts can at 
least be used to implement e=4 in the accepted contracts. Hence, the next hypothesis is no longer 
surprising.  
Hypothesis 3 [TI-treatment]: (a) Both types of principals prefer incentive to trust contracts.  
(b) Incentive contracts are more efficient and give a higher monetary payoff to the principal because 
they elicit, on average, a higher effort level than trust contracts. 
The analysis of the bonus contract is a little more complicated. The problem is, that the 
principal moves twice, first when he offers the contract and second when he chooses which bonus to 
pay. Thus, the agents may take the contract offer as a signal about the principal’s type and update the 
probability that a bonus will be paid. However, it can be shown that no separating equilibrium exists 
in this signaling game and that both types of principals must offer the same bonus contract in 
equilibrium. This contract can be characterized as follows: 
Hypothesis 4 [Bonus contract]: (a) On average, principals reward higher effort levels with higher 
bonus payments such that non-minimal effort provision is profitable for the agents.  
(b) If the a higher wage offer of the principal is not interpreted as a signal that the principal is 
selfish, then there exists a unique pooling equilibrium in which both types of principals offer w=15. 
The selfish agent chooses e=7 and is rewarded by the reciprocal principal with a bonus of 25, while 
the selfish principal does not pay a bonus. The  fair agent chooses e=2 and neither type of principal 
pays a bonus. There does not exist a separating equilibrium.  
  13 
It is obvious that a selfish principal will not pay a bonus. A fair principal, however, pays a 
bonus that equalizes her monetary payoff with that of the agent: 
10⋅e - w - b =  w + b - c(e) 
Using the implicit function theorem, we get 
2
)('10 ec
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db +
=  
If agents believe that q percent of all principals are fair and choose b in this fashion while (1-q) 
percent are self-interested and choose b=0, the bonus will, on average, increase with the effort level, 
as stipulated in H4a. The expected monetary payoff of the agent as a function of e is given by 
MA(e) = q⋅ [w + b(e)-c(e)] + (1-q)⋅ [ w-c(e)] 
Differentiating with respect to e yields 
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This expression is positive if q is large enough as compared to c'(e). Recall that, according to the cost 
schedule in Table 1, 1 ≤ c'(e) ≤ 4. For c'=1, the critical value for q is 0.18, for c' = 2 it is 0.33, for c' 
= 3 it is 0.46 and for c' = 4 it is 0.57. Hence, in a pooling equilibrium, where the agents believe that 
they face a fair principal with probability q = 0.4, profit-maximizing agents will choose the maximal 
effort level for which the marginal effort cost does not exceed 2, that is, they choose e = 7.  
It is important to note that the theory implies that only self-interested agents choose  
e = 7, hoping that they will be rewarded with a generous bonus payment by the principal. Fair agents 
choose e = 1 or e = 2 depending on the wage offered (for w ≥ 10 the fair agent chooses e = 2). The 
reason for this interesting implication is that a fair agent suffers more than a self-interested agent if 
he meets a selfish principal who does not pay the bonus. Hence, even if it is profitable from a 
monetary perspective to choose e = 7, a fair agent prefers e = 1 or e = 2 in order to ensure that 
equality prevails and to avoid the disutility from disadvantageous inequality when the bonus is not 
paid. Thus, the presence of fair principals induces selfish agents choose high effort levels while the 
presence of selfish principals induces the fair agents to provide low effort levels. This is an 
interesting example of the sometimes surprising effects that arise in a heterogeneous population with 
fair and selfish subjects.  
There are many pooling equilibria in this game that differ in the unconditional base wage 
(and therefore also in the bonus to be paid ex post). If we impose the mild condition on out of 
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equilibrium beliefs that higher wage offers are not taken as a signal that the principal is more likely 
to be selfish, then the set of pooling equilibria shrinks to a singleton in which all principals offer 
w=15.15 If the selfish agent chooses e=7, then a bonus of 25 just equalizes payoffs. However, this 
bonus is paid only by the fair principals, so the expected bonus is 0.4⋅25=10. The fair agents choose 
e=2, so the expected effort level is 0.6⋅7 + 0.4⋅2=5. 
Hypothesis 5 [BI-treatment]: Both types of principals prefer bonus to incentive contracts. The bonus 
contract elicits, on average, a higher effort level than the incentive contract and both, principals and 
agents, achieve a higher material payoff.  
H5 is in sharp contrast to the self-interest model which predicts that the IC is much more 
efficient than the BC. However, in the presence of fair principals the bonus contract is more efficient 
and more profitable for two reasons. First, it adds additional reciprocation opportunities which are 
used by the fair principals to provide powerful incentives for effort provision. Note that in a pooling 
equilibrium the selfish principals also enjoy the high effort levels although they do not contribute to 
the provision of incentives. Second, because the principals can decide how much bonus to pay after 
observing the agent’s effort, they can prevent to do worse than the agent. Therefore, both types of 
principals prefer the bonus contract to the incentive contract.  
 
Hypotheses 1-3 look very familiar, because the equilibrium predictions are quite close to the 
equilibrium predictions of the self-interest model. It is, however, surprising that they are derived 
from a model that is based on inequity aversion. This illustrates a point of general importance:16 The 
presence of a substantial fraction of fair types does not guarantee that the aggregate outcome 
diverges from the predictions of the self-interest model. However, there are also circumstances 
where the reverse is true: The presence of a majority of self-interested types does not guarantee that 
the aggregate outcome is in line with the predictions of the self-interest model. The application of the 
Fehr-Schmidt model to the BI-treatment illustrates this nicely. Although we still maintain the 
assumption that 60 percent of the subjects are completely self-interested (and rational) the 
predictions in H4 and H5 are very different compared the predictions of the self-interest model.  
                                                 
15 Note that in a pooling equilibrium with bonus contracts wages cannot exceed 15. For w > 15, b(7) = 40 – w < 25 and, 
hence, the expected bonus payment is 0.4⋅b(7) which is less than 10. Therefore, the selfish agent will no longer be willing 
to provide e = 7.  
16 In Fehr and Schmidt (1999) several other examples of this kind are provided.  
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C. Experimental Procedures 
The experiments were conducted at the University of Munich in the spring and summer of 1999. The 
participants were undergraduate students from the University and the Technical University of 
Munich (students of law, political science, engineering, etc.). The subjects were recruited with the 
announcement that they could earn, depending on their decisions, a considerable amount of money 
during the experiment. 
In total we conducted four experimental sessions. Two sessions (S1 and S2) implemented the 
TI-treatment, the other two sessions (S3 and S4) implemented the BI-treatment. In each session we 
had 20-24 subjects, half of them principals ("employers'') the other half agents ("employees''). The 
two groups were located in separate but adjacent rooms. Before the experiment started, all subjects 
had to read detailed instructions and to solve several exercises to make sure that all of them 
understand the rules of the experiment. In each session we had ten rounds. In each round an 
employee was matched with a different employer. Thus, we have for each subject in each 
experimental session ten contracts with ten different contracting partners.  
After each round the subjects had to compute their own payoff and the payoff of their partner. 
To rule out the possibility of reputation building, the outcome of each round was strictly confidential, 
that is, each principal-agent pair only observed what happened in their relationship. They did not 
observe the contracts chosen by or offered to the other subjects in the room. Nor did they observe the 
past behavior of their current partner. Furthermore, the matching was random and anonymous. 
Finally, at the end of the session the subjects collected their total monetary payoffs privately and 
anonymously. Each session lasted between two and two and a half hours. A complete set of the 
instructions for all our experiments can be found on our webpage.17  
In each session all participants received an initial endowment of DM 20.-. The experimental 
(token) payoffs were exchanged into money at the rate of 1 token = 0.2 DM. Thus, an employer and 
an employee could jointly earn a maximum surplus of DM 16 (≈US $ 10 at the time of the 
experiment) in each of the ten rounds. The highest total income of one individual was DM 115.80 
(US $72), an hourly wage of ca. DM 50 (US $31). However, the subjects could also make substantial 
losses. In order to avoid the possibility that somebody ends up with negative earnings, a subject had 
                                                 
17 The full set of all our experimental instructions, in German and translated into English, are available at 
http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls_schmidt/experiments/incomplete_contracts/index.html .  
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to drop out of the experiment if his accumulated earnings fell below DM 5.- (US $3.12), which 
happened three times.  
 
D. Experimental Results 
We first present the results of the TI-treatment where principals could choose between a a trust 
contract (w,e*) and an incentive contract (w,e*,f). We observed a total of 195 contractual choices in 
sessions S1 and S2. Nine incentive contracts and one trust contract have been rejected so that, in 
total, 185 effort choices have been made by the agents.  
Result 1(a): In the TI-treatment the clear majority of the contracts are incentive contracts and the 
share  of incentive contracts increases substantially over time.  
(b) The average effort of the agents and the average payoff of the principals are both  higher in the 
incentive contracts. 
Overall, 135 of the 195 contracts were incentive contracts (69 percent) and only 60 (31 
percent) are trust contracts. These numbers hide, however, a strong time trend in the share of 
incentive contracts. Figure 1, which depicts the evolution of contractual choices in the TI-treatment, 
shows this trend. At the beginning slightly less than 50 percent of the proposed contracts were 
incentive contracts. Yet, from period 4 onwards the fraction of incentive contracts is never below 70 
percent and in the final three periods roughly 80 percent of all contracts are incentive contracts. 
Although 71 percent of the principals tried the trust contract at least once, only 33 percent did so in 
more than three periods. This indicates that most principals experimented somewhat with the trust 
contract until they settled on the incentive contract. In view of the very high fraction of incentive 
contracts during the last three periods  H3a receives substantial support.  
R1b is illustrated by Figure 2 that depicts the evolution of average effort levels (and average 
desired effort levels) over time for both contracts. The figure shows that in almost all periods the 
average effort is higher in the incentive contracts. Moreover, in those periods in which average effort 
is somewhat higher in the trust contract, the fraction of trust contracts is already small, so that this is 
driven by very few observations. On average, the principals earned a payoff of – 0.9 when they 
proposed an incentive contract and – 2.36 when they proposed a trust contract. Although this result 
supports H3b, the support seems rather weak because, on average, the incentive contracts are much 
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less profitable and elicit lower effort levels than predicted by H2. The next result partially explains 
this effect. 
Figure 1: Share of incentive and trust contracts 
(S1 and S2)
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Result 2: Although most incentive contracts stipulate the maximal fine, the majority of incentive 
contracts violates the no-shirking condition because the principals demand too high effort levels. In 
addition, principals offer, on average, higher wages than predicted. There is, however, a strong 
increase in the share of incentive compatible contracts over time. Finally, in roughly 1/4 of all 
incentive compatible contracts agents shirk.   
R2 says that H2 is supported with regard to the predicted fine level but not with regard to the 
predicted desired effort level e*. The average fine is 12.3. Yet, in 79 (58.5 percent) of the 135 
incentive contracts the no-shirking condition is violated, i.e. principals demanded too high effort 
levels. This is also illustrated in Figure 2 which shows that the average demanded effort level in the 
incentive contracts is persistently above the maximal enforceable effort of e* = 4. However, 
demanded effort levels decline over time. At the beginning the demanded effort level is, on average, 
around e* = 6, in the final period it is only slightly above the predicted level of e* = 4. This suggests 
that, over time, the fraction of non-incentive compatible contracts decreases, which  is indeed the 
case. In period one, 90 percent of all incentive contracts are not incentive compatible. This fraction 
decreases to 36 percent in period ten.  
  18 
Figure 2: Average effort and average demanded effort in 
the trust and incentive contracts (S1 and S2)
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A similar time pattern is exhibited by average wages. During the first few periods, when the 
share of incentive compatible contracts was still low, incentive contracts stipulated on average wages 
well above 20. The average wage decreases, however, strongly over time and reaches a level of 11.9 
in period ten which is relatively close to the predicted level of 9.2. The strong time trend in the share 
of incentive compatible contracts and the average wage suggests that, initially, the principals tried to 
elicit non-incentive compatible effort levels by paying generous wages but, as these attempts failed, 
they converged slowly towards the predicted incentive contracts.  
What was the reason for the switch to incentive compatible contracts? To answer this 
question Table 2 presents more detailed information on the relative profitability of the different 
contract types and the agents’ effort behavior. The final row of Table 2 shows that the average profit 
in the incentive compatible contracts is 8.6 while it is –7.6 in the non-incentive compatible contracts. 
Thus, while incentive compatible contracts are considerably more profitable than the trust contracts, 
the non-incentive compatible contracts are less profitable than the trust contracts.18 This explains 
both the strongly increasing time trend in the fraction of incentive contracts (relative to the trust 
                                                 
18 All these differences are statistically significant according to a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test (p < 0.005 when the 
trust contract is compared to the incentive compatible contract; p < 0.036 when the trust contract is compared to non-
incentive compatible incentive contracts). 
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contract) and the strong increase in the fraction of incentive compatible contracts (relative to the non-
incentive compatible contracts).  
 
Table 2: Wages, Effort and Principals’ Payoff in the Trust-Incentive Treatment 
Incentive Compatible 
Incentive Contracts 
Non-Incentive 
Compatible Incentive 
Contracts 
Trust Contracts  
Wage 
Offer 
# rej. e<e* e≥e* P’s 
payoff 
# rej. e =1 e>1 P’s 
payoff 
# rej. e =1 e>1 P’s 
payoff 
 
low 
w < 10 
 
29 
 
8 
 
6 
 
15 
 
8.5 
 
0 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
n.a. 
 
17 
 
2 
 
15 
 
0 
 
3.7 
 
medium 
10≤w≤ 20 
 
26 
 
1 
 
6 
 
19 
 
9.8 
 
33 
 
1 
 
20 
 
12 
 
-1.4 
 
13 
 
0 
 
9 
 
4 
 
-1.0 
 
high 
20 < w 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
-20.0 
 
46 
 
0 
 
28 
 
18 
 
-12.0 
 
30 
 
0 
 
13 
 
17 
 
-6.4 
 
All 
 
56 
 
9 
 
12 
 
35 
 
8.6 
 
79 
 
1 
 
48 
 
30 
 
-7.6 
 
60 
  
37 
 
21 
 
-2.4 
Remark: In the column # the table shows the number of contract offers. The sum of the columns e<e* (e=1) 
and e≥e* (e ≥1) gives the number of accepted contract offers.  
 
There are two reasons why the incentive compatible contracts are more profitable than the 
non-incentive compatible contracts. Principals pay much higher wages when they offer non-incentive 
compatible contracts and, despite their generosity, shirking is much more frequent in these contracts. 
Table 2 shows that in all 79 offered contracts that are not incentive compatible the wage is above w = 
10 while in the majority of the incentive compatible contracts (in 29 of 56 cases) the wage is below 
w = 10. This suggests that the principals wanted to elicit reciprocal effort choices from the agents 
when they proposed non-incentive compatible contracts. Table 2 also shows, however, that these 
attempts frequently failed. In 48 (62 percent) of the 78 accepted non-incentive compatible contracts 
the agents chose the minimal effort level.19 This contrasts sharply with those contracts that meet the 
no-shirking condition. Only in 12 (26 percent) of the 47 accepted incentive compatible contracts do 
the agents shirk.20  
                                                 
19 Note that the number of accepted contracts is given by the sum of the the two effort columns. For example, for the non-
incentive compatible contracts it is given by the 48 contracts with e = 1 plus the 30 contracts with e > 1.  
20 In all 12 cases the agents shirked fully.  
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Table 2 also allows us to evaluate the prediction of H1, that the payment of generous wages 
to elicit effort levels above the incentive compatible level is not profitable for the principals. The 
table shows that for the trust contracts the principals’ payoff is monotonically decreasing in the 
offered wages.21 For wages below w = 10 the principals earns 3.7, for wages in the middle interval 
(10 ≤ w ≤ 20) the payoff declines to MP = –1.0 and for high wages (w > 20) MP = –6.4. A similar 
relation holds for the non-incentive compatible incentive contracts. In the middle interval MP = –1.4 
while for high wages MP = –12.0. This is summarized in the following result. 
Result 3: As predicted by H1, increasing the generosity of the wage offer to induce non-incentive 
compatible effort levels decreases the principals’ average payoff. 
Taken together, the theory of fairness based on inequity aversion organizes the data 
surprisingly well. The clear majority of contracts uses the explicit incentive option, in most cases the 
fine is maximal, after an initial learning period the majority of incentive contracts demands incentive 
compatible effort levels, and shirking is much more prevalent in trust contracts and in incentive 
contracts that violate the no-shirking condition. Moreover, incentive compatible contracts are much 
more profitable, and it does not pay for the principals to elicit reciprocal effort choices from the fair 
agents by paying high wages.  
Since several predictions of the theory of inequity aversion are shared by the self-interest 
model it is interesting to ask whether there are facts in the TI-treatment that allow a joint evaluation 
of the two theories. There are three facts that are roughly consistent with the theory of inequity 
aversion but contradict the self-interest model: (i) the frequent rejection of incentive compatible 
contracts with wages below w = 10, (ii) the existence of many incentive compatible contracts with 
wages between 10 and 20, and (iii) the existence of many non-minimal effort choices in the trust 
contract and the non-incentive compatible incentive contracts. Table 2 shows that roughly 30 percent 
(8 of 29) of the incentive compatible contracts in the low-wage interval are rejected. Moreover, 46 
percent (26 of 56) of the incentive compatible contracts offer wages between 10 and 20. This 
contradicts the self-interest model because in this model the principals appropriate the whole surplus 
from a contract, i. e., w = c(4) = 4. Fair principals, in contrast, share the surplus from such a contract 
by offering w = 17. The fact that 46 percent of the contracts are between 10 and 20 is roughly 
                                                 
21 This result is also confirmed by a simple OLS-regression of effort on wages that yields e = 1.08 + 0.04 w + ε where ε 
denotes the error term. The t-value for the constant is 3.11 while the t-value for the coefficient on w is 3.65. According to 
this regression, effort significantly increases with wages but the increase is associated with a loss: A wage increase by 10 
units raises effort only by 0.4 and, hence, the expected revenue increases only by 4.  
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consistent with our assumption about the share of fair subjects. Finally, the self-interest model 
predicts minimal effort choices for the trust contract and the incentive contracts that violate the no-
shirking condition. In contrast to this prediction, in 38 percent (30 of 78) of the accepted incentive 
contracts that violate the no-shirking condition the agents chose e > 1 and in 36 percent (21 of 58) of 
the accepted trust contracts we have e > 1, too. All of these facts are consistent with H1 and H2 but 
contradict the self-interest model. 
Next we turn to the results in the BI-treatment. As we will see the theory of inequity aversion 
captures the major facts in this treatment even better than in the TI-treatment while the self-interest 
model does worse than in the TI-treatment and is clearly rejected by the data. In total we observed 
230 contract offers in the BI-treatment. Four bonus contracts and two incentive contracts were 
rejected so that we have 224 accepted contracts in the BI-treatment. Our first result is again about the 
principals’ contract preferences. 
Result 4: (a) In the BI-treatment the overwhelming majority of all contracts are bonus contracts. 
(b) The average effort and the average payoff of the principals is much higher in the bonus contract 
as compared to the incentive contract.  
Result 4a and b provide unambiguous support for H5 and constitute an equally unambiguous 
rejection of the self-interest model. Figure 3 presents the evidence in favor of R4a. It shows the 
evolution of the share of bonus contracts over time. Already in period one 87 percent of all contracts 
are bonus contracts. The share of bonus contracts drops slightly below 80 percent in periods three to 
five because a few principals experimented with the incentive contract in these periods.22 Yet, from 
period six onwards the share of bonus contracts is roughly 90 percent and approaches even 96 
percent in the final period. There can thus be little doubt that principals strongly prefer the bonus 
contract.23  
 
                                                 
22 57% of all principals tried an incentive contract at least once, but only 4% did so more than three times. 
23 In the BI-treatment trust contracts, i.e. contracts in which the principals promise and pay no bonus, are completely 
absent. 
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Figure 3: Share of bonus and incentive contracts (S3 
and S4)
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To examine the reasons for this preference we compare the average effort level in bonus and 
incentive contracts (see Figure 4). The figure shows that the average effort is considerably higher in 
the bonus contracts in nine out of ten periods.24 While in the incentive contracts the average effort is, 
in general, between e = 2 and e = 3, effort in the bonus contracts is, in general, above e =5. Figure 4 
also indicates that agents’ effort in the bonus contracts is somewhat below the desired effort level but 
the gap between actual and desired effort levels is much smaller than in the incentive contracts. In 
fact, as in the TI-treatment, many incentive contracts are not incentive compatible. This is indicated 
by the fact that the desired average effort is always above e* = 4. The large effort differences 
between the contracts are also translated into large profit differences. Principals’ average profit from 
bonus contracts, taken over all ten periods, is 27 tokens while the incentive contract generates an 
average loss of 9 tokens. In each of the ten periods the average profit from bonus contracts is always 
above 20 tokens while in six of the ten periods the incentive contract causes losses and in the 
remaining periods the profits are, in general, rather low. In view of these large profit differences it is 
no longer surprising that principals exhibit a strong preference for bonus contracts.  
                                                 
24 The exemption is period ten where the effort difference is negligible. Furthermore, in the incentive contracts the 
average effort in period ten is based on a single data point.   
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Figure 4: Average effort and average demanded effort in the 
bonus-incentive treatment (S3 and S4)
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The higher effort level in the bonus contracts imply a higher surplus. To what extent did the 
agents receive part of this increase in the surplus relative to the incentive contracts. On average 
agents earned an income of 14.4 in the incentive contracts while in the bonus contracts their payoff 
was 17.8. This means that agents received a small part of the surplus increase while the bulk of the 
increase is reaped by the principals. This shows that the option to pay a bonus yields a substantial 
efficiency increase and causes sizable changes in the distribution of the surplus.  
Why is the bonus contract doing so much better than the incentive contract? According to H4 
the predicted reason for the superiority of the bonus contract is that principals respond reciprocally to 
the agents’ effort choice. Our next result shows that this is indeed the case: 
 
Result 5: (a) The average bonus is strongly increasing in the effort level so that non-minimal effort 
choices are profitable for the agents. 
(b) Principals offer on average wages of 15 and pay an average bonus of 10.4 while the agents 
average effort is equal to 5.2.  
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Figure 5: Bonus-effort relation in the bonus-incentive 
treatment (S3 and S4)
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Evidence for R5a is presented in Figure 5 which shows the average bonus as a function of the 
actual effort level. The figure exhibits a strongly increasing bonus-effort schedule. If the agents 
provide minimal or close to minimal effort levels the bonus is indeed zero while for high effort levels 
the average bonus approaches b = 30 tokens. The positive slope of the bonus-effort schedule is also 
confirmed by the following regressions:  
b = α0 + α1 e + α2 e* + α3 w +α4 b* + ε 
where ε represents the error term. Table 3 reports the outcome of this regression for each session and 
for S3 and S4 together.  
 
Table 3: Determinants of bonus payments 
Session N α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 Adj. R2 
S3 85 -10.36 
(-3.71) 
3.06 
(10.39) 
1.16 
(1.80) 
-0.43 
(-3.22) 
0.15 
(1.65) 
0.68 
S4 113 -1.51 
(-0.57) 
2.69 
(9.84) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.24 
(-1.59) 
0.04 
(0.54) 
0.50 
S3-S4 198 -5.58 
(-2.97) 
2.86 
(14.23) 
0.33 
(0.87) 
-0.30 
(-2.98) 
0.12 
(2.15) 
0.57 
Note: N denotes the number of observations, t-values are in parentheses.  
 
All regressions indicate a sizable and significantly positive effort (α1) coefficient. On average, an 
increase in the effort level by one unit increases the expected bonus payment by 2.86 tokens. Note 
that this is higher than the marginal cost of effort for all effort levels e ≤ 7, i.e., a rational and selfish 
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agent chooses an effort level of e = 7 if he faces this bonus-effort relation – exactly as predicted by 
H4. The impact of the desired effort level (α2) is small and not significant, suggesting that e* is 
considered to be cheap talk. The fixed wage enters the regression with a significantly negative sign, 
suggesting that if the actual wage increases by 1 token, the principal will reduce the bonus payment 
by 0.3 tokens on average. This is roughly in line with the predictions of the theory of inequity 
aversion because only fair principals reduce the bonus by one unit for every wage increase by one 
unit (as long as w ≤ 15). Thus, with 40 percent fair principals the predicted wage coefficient in the 
bonus regression is 0.4. The announced bonus enters significantly with a positive, but very small 
coefficient. An increase in the announced bonus by 10 tokens increases the average actual bonus by 
only 1.2 tokens. Thus, it seems that principals feel somewhat, but not very much committed to their 
bonus announcements and that the effort level is the major determinant of the principals’ bonus 
choice.  
Even though principals do reciprocate quite strongly on average, it is important to notice that 
there are big differences in individual behavior. Considering only those (162) contracts where the 
agents chose a non-minimal effort level (e > 1), the principals did not pay any bonus in 34 cases 
(21%). Among those who did pay a bonus, many paid very little even if a high effort level was 
chosen. However, there were also some principals who reciprocated very generously to high effort 
levels. These observations are only partially consistent with the theory of inequity aversion. The 
problem is that our model assumes (for simplicity) that there are only two types of individuals, those 
who do not pay any bonus and those who pay a very high bonus that equalizes payoffs. The 
experimental evidences shows that many subjects were in between these extreme cases.  
To what extent does the theory of inequity aversion predict the average values of w, b, and e 
correctly? Recall from H4b that the theory predicts a wage of 15, an average bonus of 10 and an 
average effort of 5. This is almost exactly the same as reported in R5b. Thus, despite our simplifying 
assumptions, the theory predicts the average behavior in the BI-treatment surprisingly well.  
Taken together the TI- and the BI-treatment show that the principals strongly prefer the bonus 
contract. If this contract is not available they prefer the incentive over the trust contract. In terms of 
the average effort and the average surplus associated with the three types of contracts the same 
ranking holds. Note, that this ranking implies a non-monotonic relationship between performance 
and contractual incompleteness. The bonus contract is the most incomplete contract. The agent is 
free which effort to choose and the principal is free what bonus to pay. The trust contract is 
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somewhat less incomplete. Here the agent is still unconstrained in his effort choice, but the total 
compensation is fixed in advance and is not conditional on the effort level. The most complete 
contract is the incentive contract which restricts the principal and the agent. Our experiment shows, 
that the most incomplete contract induces the highest effort and generates the highest profit for the 
principals, while the less incomplete trust contract does slightly worse than the complete incentive 
contract.25 
 
 
III. Contract Choice in the Presence of Multiple Tasks 
In the previous section the agents had to perform a single task only. While this is a convenient 
simplification it is clear that in reality most agents have to perform multiple tasks. When there are 
multiple tasks it is often the case that some aspects of the performance of an agent can be contracted 
upon, while other aspects can not. In the example of the university professor, it may be relatively 
easy to measure (and contract upon) the “quantity of production”, i.e. the number of pages written in 
academic journals, the number of hours taught, the number of PhD students supervised, etc., but it 
may be much harder to measure the “quality” of production. Holmström and Milgrom (1991) argue 
that in such an environment it may be optimal to give no incentives at all. The reason is that if the 
principal rewards the measurable performance in one task, then the agent will shift too much effort 
into this measurable activity and disregard the other tasks that are not rewarded even though they are 
very important. However, if no incentives are offered, then, under the standard assumptions that 
agents are selfish and dislike effort, the agent will put in the minimum level of effort in both tasks.  
In order to show that a trust contract can outperform an incentive contract, Holmström and 
Milgrom (1991) assume that the agent’s job is sufficiently intrinsically interesting and rewarding. 
Therefore, the agent will spend some positive amount of effort even in the absence of any incentives, 
and, because there is no distorting piece rate, he will allocate his effort efficiently across tasks. In the 
absence of intrinsic motivation the trust contract is, however, not viable. The previous experiments 
also illustrate the relatively bad performance of the trust contracts. Remember that the principals’ 
payoff was very low and fequently even negative in the trust contracts. This non-viability of trust 
                                                 
25 Recall that the principal had to pay a fixed verification cost of 10 if he chose the incentive contract. Without this cost, 
the incentive contract would do considerably better than the trust contract, but still much worse than the bonus contract.  
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contracts in the absence of sufficient intrinsic motivation seems to severely limit the multi-tasking 
argument for incomplete contracts.  
The situation is, however, very different if, instead of trust contracts, bonus contracts are 
considered. Because of the presence of fair principals bonus contracts, although highly incomplete,  
may providepowerful implicit incentives for effort provision. Moreover, bonus contracts may avoid 
an inefficient effort allocation across tasks because the actual bonus can be made dependent on the 
performance of the agent in all tasks. Therefore, if incomplete bonus contracts are taken into 
account, the multi-tasking argument for incomplete contracts may be valid irrespective of whether 
agents are intrinsically motivated, i.e., in a much larger class of environments. To test this conjecture 
we have conducted multi-task principal agent experiments in which effort costs are strictly 
increasing for all effort levels. Therefore, self-interested agents will never provide more than the 
minimal effort if they face no material incentives.  
 
A. The Multi-Tasking Experiment 
In this experiment the principal can choose between a piece rate contract and a bonus contract. We 
call this treatment, therefore, piece rate-bonus (PB) treatment. Note that the trust contract can be 
considered as a special case of a “bonus” contract in which the principal chooses b* = 0. In contrast 
to the previous treatments there are two separate tasks and the effort levels in these task are denoted 
by e1 and e2. Effort is observable in both tasks but only e1 is verifiable and can be contracted upon. 
For example, e1 could measure the quantity of production and e2 its quality. Or, e1 may be interpreted 
as effort invested in production and e2 as effort invested in maintaining the machinery. In both of 
these examples it may be easy to verify e1 but prohibitively costly if not impossible to verify e2. In 
both tasks the set of feasible effort choices is given by ei ∈ {1, ... , 10}, and the total effort cost is 
c(e1+e2), where c(⋅) is strictly increasing according to the cost function presented in Table 4. Note 
that e1 and e2 are perfect substitutes in the agent's cost function. Gross profit of the principal is given 
by v(e1,e2) = 10⋅e1⋅e2. Thus, efforts are complements at the margin from the point of view of the 
principal.  
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Table 4: Effort cost function in the piece rate-bonus treatment 
e=e1+e2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
c(e) 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 
 
At date 0 the principal can offer a piece rate contract, denoted by (e1*,e2*,w,s), that specifies 
a desired effort level for each task, (e1*,e2*), a binding wage, w, and a binding piece-rate s (sharing 
rule) for every unit of actual effort e1. Alternatively, the principal can offer a bonus contract, denoted 
by (e1*,e2*,w,b*). This contract also specifies a desired effort level for each task, (e1*,e2*), and a 
binding base wage, w, but instead of the piece-rate it announces a non-binding bonus, b*.26 Both 
parties know that the bonus payment cannot be enforced and is completely voluntary. At date 1 the 
agent accepts or rejects the contract offer. If he rejects, both parties get a payoff of zero. If he 
accepts, he chooses his actual effort levels, (e1,e2). At date 2, contracts are executed and, if a bonus 
contract has been chosen, the principal decides how much bonus to pay. Payoffs are given by  

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The predictions of the self-interest model for the PB-treatment are straightforward. In any piece rate 
contract a self-interested agent chooses his effort in the non-verifiable task to be e2 = 1. Hence, the 
marginal revenue of e1 is 10. Given e2 = 1, the agent's marginal cost of effort in task 1 is 5 if e1 ≤ 9 
and 10 if e1 > 9. Therefore, the profit-maximizing piece rate contract is to offer w = 5, e1* = 9, and s 
= 5, which induces the agent to accept the contract and to choose e1 = 9 and e2 = 1. Hence, the 
principal's monetary payoff from a piece rate contract is MP  = 10⋅9⋅1 – 5 - 5⋅9 = 40 while the agent 
gets MA = 5 - c(9+1) + 5⋅9 = 0.  
With a bonus contract a rational agent foresees that the bonus will never be paid and chooses 
e1 =e2 = 1. Thus, the principal should offer w = c(1+1 )= 10, while the announced bonus and the 
desired effort levels are cheap talk. In equilibrium the agent accepts this offer, the principal's 
                                                 
26 In both contracts the binding part of the compensation had to cover the cost of the desired effort levels. That is, the 
bonus contract requires w≥c(e1*+e2*), while the piece rate contract requires w +se1*≥c(e1*+e2*). As in the TI- and BI-
treatments we imposed these constraints to guarantee that loss aversion of the agents does not affect the results. 
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monetary payoff is MP = 10⋅1⋅1 – 10 = 0 and the agent also gets MA = 10 - c(1+1) = 0. The 
maximum surplus in the PB-treatment is achieved if the agent chooses e1 =e2 = 10, which yields MP 
+ MA = 10⋅10⋅10 – 150 = 850.  
These predictions of the self-interest model imply that the principals prefer the piece rate 
contract – despite the presence of multiple tasks and despite the fact that the principals can only 
provide incentives for e1. The reason is that (in contrast to Holmström and Milgrom) the principal 
cannot increase performance in task 2 by reducing the incentives for task 1. A self-interested agent 
will always choose the minimal effort in task 2, irrespective of the incentives provided for task 1. 
Hence, according to the self-interest model there should be no interaction between the two tasks in 
our experiment. 
 
B. Hypotheses 
What are the predictions if there is a fraction of inequity averse subjects? We rely here again on the 
model by Fehr and Schmidt and maintain all the previously made assumptions regarding the 
characteristics and the share of fair types.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Principals in the PB-treatment prefer the bonus contract relative to the piece rate 
contract. 
  
Hypothesis 7: (a) Piece rate contracts are associated with a very uneven, i. e., inefficient, allocation 
of effort across tasks while in the bonus contracts the effort allocation is efficient.  
(b) Moreover, total effort and the material payoff of the principals is higher in the bonus contracts. 
 
Hypothesis 8: On average the bonus payments are increasing in total effort and decreasing in effort 
differences across tasks. Thus there is an implicit incentive for the agent’s to provide more than the 
minimal effort and to equalize effort levels across tasks.  
 
Hypothesis 9: If a higher wage offer of the principal is not interpreted as a signal that the principal 
is selfish, then there exists a unique pooling equilibrium in which both types of principal offer w = 
225 and principals pay, on average, a bonus of b = 84. On average, agents choose an effort level of 
e1 = e2 = 8.4. There does not exist a separating equilibrium 
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Again, it is not very difficult to solve this game with Fehr and Schmidt’s model of inequity 
aversion, but it is a little bit involved and the complete analysis can be found on our webpage (see 
Footnote 16) . However, the intuition for these hypotheses is very similar to the intuition we 
provided for hypotheses H4 and H5. It does not pay for the principal to appeal to the agent’s fairness 
in the piece rate contract because there are too few fair agents. Therefore, it is not possible to induce 
high effort levels in task 2 with a piece rate contract; most agents will engage only in task 1. In 
contrast, with a bonus contract, the share of fair principals is sufficient to provide strong pecuniary 
incentives for the selfish agents in both tasks. Since fair principals will pay the bonus at date 2 only if 
performance is to their satisfaction, they can penalize low total effort and an uneven allocation of 
effort across tasks. As a consequence the agents perform well in both tasks which renders the bonus 
contract more profitable. 
 
C. Results 
The PB-treatment consists of three experimental sessions. In each session we had again 20-24 
subjects, half of them principals, the other half agents.27 In total there are 330 contract offers in the 
PB-treatment. 7 piece rate contracts and 6 bonus contracts were rejected which makes a total of 317 
accepted contract offers and effort choices.  
 
Result 6: In the PB-treatment a large majority of all contracts are bonus contracts. 
 
Support for R6 is provided in Figure 6 that shows the time pattern of the share of bonus contracts. In 
period 1 the share of bonus contracts is already above 70 percent and it never falls below that level. 
In some periods the principals experimented somewhat with the piece rate contract but only 27 
percent of the principals offered a piece rate contract more than three times. After period 1 the share 
of bonus contracts fluctuates between 75 and 88 percent and in the final period it reaches 85 percent. 
If one averages over all periods the share is 81 percent. Thus, the bonus contract clearly is the 
                                                 
27 In the PB treatment we applied the same experimental procedures as in the TI- and the BI-treatment (see Section II.B). 
The only difference was that 1 token = DM 0.02 instead of DM 0.2. This change was required because the revenue 
function in the PB treatment is given by 10e1e2 whereas in the TI- and the BI-treatment it was 10e. The maximal revenue 
was thus exactly ten times higher in the PB-treatment. Subjects‘ average earnings in the PB-treatment in DM are similar 
to those in the BI-treatment. A full set of instructions in German and translated into English is available at 
http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls_schmidt/experiments/incomplete_contracts/index.html . 
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preferred choice by the principals which confirms H6.28 The reason for the relative popularity of the 
bonus contract can be seen from our next result. 
 
Figure 6: Share of bonus and piece rate contracts 
(S5 - S7)
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Result 7: (a) In the piece rate contracts the effort allocation is very uneven across tasks while in the 
bonus contracts the effort levels are, on average, nearly identical in both tasks. (b) The total average 
effort in the bonus contract is roughly equal to the total average effort in the piece rate contract. (c) 
Due to the much more efficient effort allocation across tasks the principals’ payoff is much higher in 
the bonus contracts.  
 
Figure 7 shows the evidence for R7a. It depicts the evolution of the average effort levels in 
both tasks and for both contracts. The figure exhibits three features: First, in the bonus contracts the 
average effort across tasks is nearly indistinguishable. There is also a slight decrease in the effort 
over time in these contracts. Second, in the piece rate contracts the effort in the verifiable task, e1, is 
higher than the effort levels in the bonus contracts. Only in period 10, e1 is substantially below 9. 
Finally, the effort in the non-verifiable task, e2, is much lower than in the bonus contracts. In the final 
two periods e2 converges, as predicted, to the minimal level. Thus, Figure 7 provides strong support 
for H7a, the bonus contract achieves an efficient effort allocation while the piece rate contract does 
                                                 
28 Trust contracts, i.e. contracts in which the principals promise and pay no bonus, are completely absent.  
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not. However, H7b, which stipulates a higher total effort in the bonus contracts, is only met in the 
final period. In the other periods total effort e1 + e2 is similar in both types of contract.  
 
Figure 7: Average effort in  piece rate and bonus 
contracts (S5 - S7)
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Because average graphs frequently hide differences at a more disaggregated level it is also 
useful to take a closer look at the effort distributions in the bonus and the piece rate contracts (see 
Table 5). The table shows that in the bonus contracts most effort choices are close or at the main 
diagonal which indicates efficient effort allocations across tasks. In addition, the effort distribution is 
bimodal. 25 percent of all observations (66 of 261) are at the minimal effort levels (1,1) and 34 
percent (89 of 261) are at effort levels bigger or equal to 9 for both tasks. In contrast, in the piece rate 
contracts it is extremely rare that the agents chose the minimal effort in the verifiable task which 
illustrates the effectiveness of the piece rate in the elicitation of e1. However, Table 5 also shows that 
the most frequent effort choice in the non-verifiable task is e2 = 1. In fact, in 26 of 57 (46 percent) of 
all piece rate contracts this is the case. Thus, Table 5 also indicates the highly inefficient effort 
allocation in the piece rate contracts. 
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Table 5: Effort distribution in bonus and piece-rate contracts 
 
Effort distribution in 
bonus contracts 
 Effort distribution in 
piece-rate contracts 
e1/e2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  e1/e2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 66 1          1 1 1         
2    1        2           
3 1 1 3 1 1  1     3           
4  1 1 6 2   1  1  4    1       
5    1 16 5      5 1     1     
6     4 7 4     6 1 1         
7      1 12 6    7    1 1      
8     1 1 6 10 2 2  8  1  2       
9 1      2  20 2  9 8 1 3 2       
10     1   2 4 63  10 15 2 4 3 1 4  1  1 
 
 
Due to the complementarity of the effort in the revenue function, principals’ revenues and, 
hence, their profits are much higher in the bonus contracts. In all ten periods the principals’ average 
profit in the bonus contracts is higher than in the piece rate contracts. If we average over all ten 
periods, the principals earned 237 tokens in a bonus contract while their income from a piece rate 
contract is only 41 tokens. Moreover, in four out of ten periods the principals average profit is even 
negative in the piece rate contracts while in the bonus contracts it is never below 178 tokens. A 
similar picture arises with regard to the agents’ material payoff. In each of the ten periods the agents 
earn substantially higher incomes in the bonus contracts than in the piece rate contracts.  
In view of the unambiguous payoff advantage of the bonus contract it becomes clear why the 
principals preferred this contract. It is, so far, however, less clear why the bonus contract was so 
successful in establishing an efficient effort allocation. The answer to this question is provided by 
our next result. 
 
Result 8: The average bonus is increasing in total effort and decreasing in effort differences. It was 
profitable for the agents to provide non-minimal total effort and equalize the effort across tasks in 
the bonus contracts.  
 
The first piece of evidence for R8 is given in Figure 8 which shows the actual average bonus 
as a function of total, actual effort.  
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Figure 8: Average bonus and effort cost as a function of 
total effort (S5 - S7)
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The figure shows that total effort levels below 10 were almost never rewarded with a bonus. For total 
effort levels above 10 the bonus-effort relation is, however, increasing and the principals made 
substantial bonus payments. For the maximum effort level, e. g., the agents received a reward of 
roughly 250 tokens. To examine whether it was profitable for the agents to choose non-minimal 
effort levels Figure 8 also depicts the effort cost function. The comparison between the effort cost 
function and the bonus-effort relation reveals that it was, on average, not profitable for the agents to 
choose non-minimal total effort levels below 18. For the two highest effort levels, the agents 
received, however, sufficiently high rewards to render the choice of these effort levels profitable. 
The choice of the maximal effort level, in particular, turns out to be very profitable for the agents. 
Figure 8 also provides an explanation for the fact that the majority of the effort choices were either 
minimal or maximal. This was perfectly rational given the pattern of bonus payments.  
To further examine the determinants of bonus payments we ran the OLS-regression 
b  =  α0⋅d + α1 ⋅ (1 - d) + α2⋅(e1 + e2)d  + α3⋅(e1 + e2)⋅(1 – d) + α4⋅e1 - e2 + α5⋅w  + α6⋅b* + ε, 
where d is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if total effort is below 10. Thus α2 
measures the slope of the bonus-effort relation for e1 + e2 < 10 and α3 measures the slope for e1 + e2 
≥ 10. We also included the absolute value of e1 - e2 as a regressor to examine whether principals 
penalized unequal effort levels across tasks. In addition, the regression measures the impact of the 
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base wage and the promised bonus on actual bonus payments. Table 6 presents the results of our 
regressions. 
Table 6: Determinants of bonus payments in the piece rate – bonus treatment 
 
Variable Session 5 Session 6 Session 7 S5 – S7 
α0 -44.34 
(-41.18) 
11.23 
 (16.21) 
4.82 
(51.37) 
0.19 
(20.40) 
α1 -170.23 
(69.67) 
-49.64 
(39.25) 
-129.05 
(64.58) 
-225.45 
(30.90) 
α2 -0.95 
(9.65) 
0.78 
(2.88) 
17.56 
(9.71) 
3.16 
(3.92) 
α3 20.61 
(3.64) 
6.36 
(2.60) 
19.37 
(3.32) 
23.09 
(1.87) 
α4 -13.47 
(8.73) 
-0.56 
(5.15) 
-60.81 
(26.39) 
-13.09 
(5.76) 
α5 -0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
0.12 
(0.14) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
α6 0.18 
(0.09) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.25 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
R2 0.62 0.13 0.76 0.74 
N 107 79 75 261 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, N denotes the number of observations 
 
Most importantly, the regressions show that, for e1 + e2 ≥ 10, the bonus rises with total effort in all 
sessions. The α3–coefficient is always relatively high and estimated with a small standard error. The 
second important results is that the α4–coefficient is negative in each session and for the data of all 
sessions, i.e., uneven effort allocations across tasks are penalized by the principals.29 Thus, agents 
had a good reason to equalize effort levels across tasks. Since α5 is not significant and very small the 
base wage does not seem to affect the bonus. The promised bonus is also not significant except in 
session 5 which means that, on average, the promises are just cheap talk. However, with regard to the 
impact of b* on b the average is misleading because there are significant differences across 
individuals. If we add to the regressions in Table 6 interaction terms between b* and the dummies for 
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the individual principals, significant differences among the principals can be observed. For 26 
percent of the principals b* has a significant positive impact on b – usually in the range between 0.3 
and 0.5. Thus, these principals seem to feel some obligation to do what they promised. Finally, we 
turn to the numerical predictions of our model as summarized in H9. 
 
Result 9: The average wage and the average effort in both tasks is lower than predicted while the 
average bonus is higher than predicted in Hypothesis H9. 
Remember that we predicted an average wage of 225. In fact, the average wage fluctuates 
across periods between 120 (the minimum) and 172 (the maximum). In this context it is worthwhile 
to mention that our wage prediction is based on the plausible “refinement” that, in equilibrium, the 
agents’ belief of facing a fair principal is nondecreasing in the offered wage. In the absence of this 
assumption our model does not give us a unique wage prediction. However, while this refinement 
worked very well in the BI-treatment, it does not deliver the right predictions in the PB-treatment. 
With regard to the average effort the model is also not completely accurate because in most periods 
effort in both tasks is roughly 6 instead of the predicted value of 8.4. In comparison to the wage 
prediction, our bonus prediction is much better. We predicted an average bonus of 84 while the 
actual average bonus is 95.  
 
Although our model does not yield accurate predictions in all dimensions it captures the 
major regularities of the PB-treatment quite well whereas the self-interest model is clearly rejected 
by the data: The bonus contract is more efficient and yields higher incomes for the principals and the 
agents. Principals predominantly choose the bonus contract and a substantial fraction of the 
principals rewards high effort and penalizes inefficient effort choices. It is thus not necessary to rely 
on intrinsic motivation to explain the use of incomplete contracts in the context of multiple tasks. 
The incomplete bonus contract is superior to the more complete piece rate contracts even in the 
absence of any intrinsic motivation.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
29 The α4–coefficient is not significant in S5 and S6. The likely reason for this is that in these sessions there are only a 
few observations with unequal effort allocations across tasks. This interpretation is supported by the fact that in S5-S7 α4 
is highly significant. 
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IV. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have shown theoretically that the existence of fair people may have important  
consequences for the optimal provision of incentives. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there 
are only selfish actors perform less well when some agents are concerned about fairness. On the 
other hand, incomplete bonus contracts that cannot work when all actors are selfish provide powerful 
incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions receive 
considerable support by our experiments. In particular, the principals seem to understand that 
fairness matters and predominantly choose the contract predicted by the fairness approach. Our 
theoretical and experimental results also indicate that the presence of fair players may be an 
important reason for contractual incompleteness. The incomplete bonus contract uses reciprocity as 
an enforcement device. It gives more discretion to the principals to reciprocate to the agent’s effort, 
which renders this contract more efficient than more complete contracts that rely on explicit 
incentives only.  
There are several other points that deserve to be emphasized. First, it is important to keep in 
mind that only some subjects are "reciprocators" who are prepared to reward friendly behavior and to 
punish unfriendly behavior even if this is costly to them. There is also a considerable fraction of 
subjects who seem to be interested only in their own material payoff. Second, whether or not 
appealing to reciprocal fairness works as an enforcement device depends on the fraction of fair types 
in the population and on the strategic situation in which the subjects interact. We have seen, for 
example, that the trust contract is not a good alternative to the more complete incentive contract. 
Third, we have shown that the multi-task argument for contractual incompleteness holds under more 
general conditions than envisaged by Holmström and Milgrom (1991). Although under the standard 
assumption of purely self-interested behavior the piece rate contract is predicted to be the preferred 
choice of the principals, the clear majority of the principals prefers the incomplete bonus contract. 
Forth, our theoretical results show that simple and tractable models of fairness can yield interesting 
an non-obvious insights into the problems of incentive provision. The Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model 
turns out to be surprisingly accurate in explaining the details of our experimental results and it 
organizes the qualitative data pattern in all treatments very well.  
Our theoretical analysis and our experiments also show that the presence of fair types does 
not automatically provide a solution to every contracting problem and may sometimes even 
exacerbate incentive and contracting problems. Fair types are much more afraid of “exploitative” 
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situations in which the other party may take advantage of them. The reason is that they do not only 
value their material payoffs but they also value the fairness of the behavior of their opponents and 
the equity of the final outcomes. For example, our theoretical analysis shows that self-interested 
agents respond much stronger to the implicit incentives provided by a bonus contract. The reason is 
that – in case that the principal does not reward the agent with a bonus – a fair agent experiences 
additional disutility from the unfairness of the behavior of the principal while the selfish agent 
“only” suffers from the reduced material payoff. This shows that the presence of fair types may 
complicate the task of incentive provision because – in addition to the conventional incentive 
compatibility constraints – the “fairness compatibility” of the contract also has to be taken into 
account.  
We believe that the effects described in this paper, that have been neglected in contract theory 
so far, are important for the optimal design of contracts and other governance structures, and that 
they will prove useful to better understand the provision of incentives in many other contexts as well.   
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